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SEE The Second World War synonyms thesaurus.COMthe war between axis and allies, starting on September 1, 1939, with the German invasion of Poland and ending with the surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, and Japan on August 14, 1945. Abbreviation: World War II Trade Center, World Trade Organisation, World View, World War II, World War II, World War II World War I, World War II, World War III, world-weary, world-weary, World Wide Web, wormDictionary.com Unabridged Based on Random House Unabridged Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2020cara (1939-1945), in which allies (mainly Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the USA) defeated axis powers (mainly Germany, Italy and Japan). The German invasion of Poland (1 September 1939) Great Britain and France declared war in Germany (3 September 1939). Italy started the war on June 10, 1940 before the collapse of France (ceasefire signed on June 22, 1940). On June 22, 1941 Germany attacked the Soviet Union and on December 7, 1941 Japan attacked the U.S. pearl harbor. (1943-09-08)8 September 1943 Italy surrendered to the war in Europe, which ended on 7 May 1945 with the unconditional abandonment of the Germans. Japan capitulated on August 14, 1945 as a direct result of atomic bombs dropped by Americans in Hiroshima and NagasakiAlso called: World War IICollins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 2012 Digital Edition © By William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1979, 1986 © HarperCollins Publishers 1998, In 2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2009, 2012A, war fought between 1939 and 1945 between the axis powers – Germany, Italy and Japan and the Allies, including France and Britain, and later the Soviet Union and the United States. The war began when the Germans, who were ruled by the Nazi Party, were arrested in September 1939. Germany then conquered France, using Blitzkrieg tactics, and forced a desperate British exit from Dunkirk. The Germans tried to drag the British to heavy bombings, but the British withstood the attacks (see D&C 100:10). The Soviet Union signed a treaty with Adolf Hitler, but joined the war on the Allied side after it was arrested in 1941. Germany invaded Russia. The United States was involved in the war in 1941 when the Japanese abruptly attacked an American naval base in Pearl Harbor. Japan has made numerous conquests in East Asia, but has tested the battle for American victories on Midway Island and elsewhere. The German invasion of Russia was stopped in the Battle of Stalingrad. In 1943, the joint forces captured much of Italy, forcing a conspiracy. Starting with the Normandy invasion in 1944 (see Germany surrendered in May 1945. The war in the Pacific ended in September 1945. After the Second World War, the defeated countries were subject to more constructive and less criminal measures than after the First World War (see A new dictionary of cultural literacy, the Third Edition of copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved ID: 12355 WORD DAYEX LIBRIS | [eks-lee-bris, lah-y-] [eks-lee-bris, lah-y-] [eks-lee-bris, lah-y-] [ex SEE DEFINITION]D you know this synonym? Now! © 2020 Dictionary.com, LLC This article is written as a personal reflection of a personal essay, or an argumentative essay that states the Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about the topic. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopaedic style. (April 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this template message) The United States' goals and programs for national security, better known as NSC 68, were a 66-page secret National Security Council (NSC) policy document prepared by the State Department and the Department of Defense and presented by President Harry S. Truman on April 7, 1950. It was one of America's most important political statements of the Cold War. According to scientist Ernest R. May, NSC 68 provided a Cold War militarization plan since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. NSC 68 and its subsequent reinforcements advocated significant expansion of the military budget of the United States, the development of a hydrogen bomb, and increased military assistance to allies of the United States. As a result, the withdrawal of global communist development has become a more important priority. NSC 68 rejected alternative policies for the containment of the friendly détente and the Soviet Union. [1] Historical backgrounds Until the events of the 1950s dictated the need to examine US national security policy: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) began to operate, military aid to European allies began, the Soviet Union detonated an atomic bomb, and the Communists strengthened their control over China. In addition, the British sterling dollar crisis of the summer of 1949 brought home to U.S. officials that the Marshall Plan would not be sufficient to cure western European economic woes until 1952, with a plan planned to end the year, with the prospect that Western Europe would have no choice but to pursue autarky, as it had in the 1930s, with all the associated challenges that would put the global economy in general and the US economy in particular. [2] Similar problems have also plagued Japan. [3] With these threats expanding, president Truman instructed the State Department and the Department of Defense to re-examine our goals for peace and war and the impact of these goals on our strategic plans. The State Defence Policy Review Team was set up under the direction of Paul Nitze's State Department. [4] Nitze, that the document refers only to the most string-of statements about the Soviet Union. The analysis of top Kremlin experts such as George Kennan, Llewellyn Thompson, and Charles Bohlen was categorically omitted. The Kennan-Thompson-Bohlen Group argued that Stalin's main objective was to ensure strict control over the USSR and its satellites, but that it had no plan to achieve global domination (an assessment shared today by most historians). Nitze, however, insisted that the Soviets were determined to conquer the whole of Europe and most of Asia and Africa. Dean Acheson, another hawkish adviser to Truman, wrote that the NSC's 68 goal was so bludgeon to the top government's mind that not only could the president make a decision, but that a decision could be made. [5] Representatives of the Department of Defence initially opposed proposals in committee that would exceed the current eur 12.5 billion deficit. [6] The report, appointed by NSC 68, was submitted to President Truman on 7 April 1950, which referred it to the NSC for consideration on 12 April 1950. [7] NSC Research Team: Paul Nitze, Chairman john p. Davis Robert Tufts Robert Hooker Dean Acheson Charles E. Bohlen Major General Truman Landon, Joint Chief Representative Samuel S. Bhutan Robert Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense initially, President Truman opposed NSC 68 when he was brought to it in 1950. He believed it wasn't specific about which programs would be affected or replaced, and it also didn't do well with its previous defense spending limits. Truman sent it back for further review before he finally approved it in 1951. [8] The document outlined the United States' de facto national security strategy at the time (although it was not the official national security strategy in the form we know today) and analysed the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the United States from military, economic, political and psychological terms. NSC 68 described the challenges facing the United States cately. The issues that confront us are significant, the document states, involved in the execution or destruction not only of this Republic, but of civilization itself. [9] The content and significance of NSC 68 have seen that the objectives and objectives of the United States are reliable but poorly implemented, calling current programs and plans... dangerously inadequate. [10] While George F. Kennan's theory of containment has shaped a multifaceted approach to US foreign policy in response to the perceived Soviet threat, the report recommends a policy that emphasized the military versus diplomatic action. Kennan's influential 1947 Article X advocated a policy of containment towards the Soviet Union. He described isolation as a policy of calculated and gradual coercion and called for high peace costs, in which the US had the highest total power... reliably combined with other like-minded nations. In it called for the creation of a military capable of defending the Western Hemisphere and the necessary Allied zones in order to develop their military capabilities; Securing the mobilization base and protecting the offensive forces needed for victory; conduct offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-building capability and maintain the balance of the enemy until a complete offensive by the United States and its allies is delayed; the communications and base areas necessary for the performance, defence and maintenance of the above mentioned tasks; and to provide such assistance to allies as are necessary for the performance of their role in the performance of the above mentioned tasks. NSC 68 itself did not have any specific cost estimates at a time when the United States was making six to seven percent of its GNI defense. It was obvious that the president's previous defense spending limits were too low. The report called for triple defense spending of \$40 or \$50 billion a year from the initial \$13 billion fix in 1950. [11] It stated that tax cuts and reductions in federal spending for purposes other than defence and foreign aid, where appropriate, deferral of certain preferred programmes[10] are a means of paying for it. But several officials involved in the study, including the future chairman of Economic Relations Leon Keyserling, suggested that a massive increase in military spending could be given by deliberately recognizing a government deficit that would bring added energy benefits and stimulate parts of the American economy, as it did after the 1930s. [12] Indeed, the document points out that achieving a large gross national product can help the united States in building economic and military capabilities[10] and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett also said that the American economy could benefit from the kind of accumulation we are proposing. [13] The argument over the relationship with US foreign policy is that if the sphere of Soviet influence continues to grow, it can become such a powerful force that no coalition of nations can group together and defeat. This means that militarisation is needed for American self-protection. In other words, the aggressive nature of Soviet development requires a strong response from the U.S. to prevent American destruction. This was formulated in the context of military exploits (a reference to the military victory of The I and World War II), and therefore emphasized military development. It is also very important to understand this document is language. Primary sources must be carefully read in order to identify topics or motives. Adjectives provide valuable insight into the motives of the authors of this document and the impression it had for its intended audience. For example, a description of the international situation provoked by the Soviet endemic. Using this language, it is clear that the authors wanted to portray the Soviet Union as a disease, and the US as a cure. This message was received loud and clear, and dominated many foreign policy decisions during the Cold War. When the report was sent to top officials of the Truman administration for review before the official presentation to the president, many of them scoffed at their arguments. Willard Thorp questioned his assertion that the USSR is constantly reducing the difference between its overall economic power and the United States. Thorp said: I don't think this position is proven, but vice versa... The real gap is widening in our favour. He noted that in 1949 the US economy grew twice as much as the Soviet Union. Steel production in the USA surpassed the Soviet Union by 2 million tonnes; accumulation of goods and oil production far exceeded soviet sums. As for Soviet military investment, Thorp was sceptical that the USSR had committed such a large part of its GDP: I think a greater proportion of Soviet investment was in housing. William Schaub of the Budget Office was particularly strict, believing that in every arena, the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the accumulation of atomic bomb stockpiles, the economy of the USA was much superior to the Soviet Union. Kennan, though his father's containment policy, also disagreed with the document, especially his call for mass rearsalization (FRUS, 1950, Vol. I). Truman's position under President Harry S. Truman, even after the Soviets became a nuclear power, sought to curb military spending. However, it did not reject the recommendations of the NSC 68, but asked for further information, i.e. to request the calculation of the related costs. Little progress has been made in the report in two months. By June Nitze practically abandoned it. However, on June 25, 1950, North Korean forces crossed 38 parallel north. [14] At the beginning of the Korean War, NSC 68 gained new importance. As Acheson later remarked: Korea... triggered by the stimulus that made the action. [15] Public opinion The Truman administration has launched a national public relations campaign to convince Congress and opinion polls that a strategic overhaul and containment of Soviet communism is needed. She had to overcome isolationists, including Senator Robert A. Taft, who wanted less global involvement, as well as intense anti-communists such as James Burnham, who proposed an alternative strategy rollback that would eliminate communism or possibly start a preventive war. The State Department and the White House used north Korean attacks in the June 1950s in see-saw battles during the first few months of the Korean War to steer Congress and public opinion toward remark

between the two preventive war and isolationism. [16] The historical debate in NSC 68 is a source of much historical debate, as is the escalation of the Cold War. As Ken Young, an early Cold War historian, stated: The report was constantly analyzed and commented. ... Although the NSC 68 appeared in the middle of the twentieth century, it retains an exceptional meaning in the 21st century. [17] This was an important part of the overall transition of American foreign policy to a comprehensive isolation strategy adopted by successive administrations. In 1962, scientist Paul Y. Hammond presented the first comprehensive, contemporary, interview-based report on the formation of NSC 68. [17] Subsequent analyses range from Michael Hogan's belief that NSC 68 portrayed a threat in the worst possible light for those who believe they provided an accurate picture of a real and growing threat. Cold War expert Melvyn Leffler describes the description of the Soviet threat in the document as a hyperbolic and modern rhetoric precursor to the war on terror. He argues that language blurred important differences, distorted priorities and complex perception of threats. [18] Cold War scholar Bruce Cumings made a small case that the American and South Korean elites started the Korean War in order to promote an aggressive strategy for NSC 68 for president and society, and thus cement America's capitalist dominance in Asia. [19] Conclusion This document is essential for understanding the Cold War and its impact on similar national security statements, such as President George W. Bush's report on the War on Terror in September 2001. [17] It relates not only to documents such as the National Security Strategy, march 2005, but also to current US foreign policy. [20] [failed to verify] the implementation of NSC 68 shows the extent to which it has marked a shift in US policy, not only in relation to the USSR but also to all communist governments. By signing the document, Truman presented a clearly defined and coherent US policy that was not in fact the case. It can also be argued that NSC 68, as proposed by the council, drew attention to Truman's problem of being attacked from the right after the red scare and the Alger Hiss case. Although NSC 68 has not been made public, it has subsequently increased America's conventional and nuclear capabilities, thereby increasing the country's financial burden. While NSC 68 made no specific recommendations for the proposed increase in defense spending, the Truman administration nearly tripled defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product between 1950 and 1953 (5 to 14.2 percent). [21] See also Reviews of American History (1994) 22# 3 p. 507-511 JSTOR Curt Cardwell, NSC 68 and early Cold War political economy (Cambridge, 2011). ^ William S. Borden, Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japan Trade Policy, 1947-1955 (Wisconsin, 1984) ^ Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: Containment Strategies forging, Short Timeline, p. 17-9. ^ Mitchell, Gordon R. ANY MEASURES NECESSARY: NSC-68 AND COLD WAR ROOTS OF THE 2002 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY. Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. ^ The Block, Fred L. International Origins. Google Books. 28, 2010, on the Internet. 29 April 2010 † Paul H Nitze, S Nelson Drew, Ed., NSC-68: Forging containment strategy, short chronology, p. 17-9. ^ Paul H. Nitze, S. Nelson Drew, Ed., NCS-68: Forging Containment Strategy, p. 6, National Defense University, Washington DC: 1994, 2011 - Alfred Andr and James Overfield. 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NSC 162/2 was NSC 162, which was the final synthesis of the task force reports on Project Solarium. [1] On 7 January 1955, NSC 162/2 was replaced by NSC 5501. [2] Mass countermeasures NSC 162/2 stated that the United States must maintain a strong military posture, stressing that offensive force can cause enormous retaliation and that, in the event of war, the United States will maintain nuclear weapons for use as other ammunition. See also Massive Revenge Deterrence Theory Project Solarium NSC 68 Links ^ Mitrovich, Gregory (2000). Hurting the Kremlin: America's strategy to injure the Soviet bloc, 1947-1956. Cornell University Press. 145 p. isbn 0801437113. 2000 - Mitrovich, Gregory. Hurting the Kremlin: America's strategy to injure the Soviet bloc, 1947-1956. Cornell University Press. 166, p. 166. isbn 0801437113. External references NSC 162/2 original document NSC 162/2, digitized version of the Historian's Office, obtained from

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